Soviet Agents of Influence

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SOVIET AGENTS OF INFLUENCE

An intelligence service has two major functions in a target country. One is to collect information from either classified or unclassified sources. The second is to influence the situation in that country. The Soviet term "active measures" includes a wide variety of influence operations including covert KGB influence activities. In carrying out this function the KGB uses agents of influence, forgeries and disinformation. KGB covert active measures are coordinated with the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which also conducts semi-overt influence operations. These are carried out by the international Soviet fronts as well as by the local Communist Parties and their fronts. While this activity is "overt," it maintains some cover and deniability for the Soviet Union. The Ideology Department of the Central Committee CPSU is responsible for the really "overt," i.e., officially attributed, influence operations usually carried out by the Soviet media and aimed at foreign audiences.

Active measures can take such benign forms as media placement (that is, the placing of information favorable to Soviet interests in the publications, or electronic media, in the target country) to violent activity such as support for paramilitary operations. Media placement and agent of influence operations may utilize either true information or false information. The Soviets call their false information operations "disinformation."

KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin, who retired in March 1990, has spoken out against some of the abuses carried out by the KGB. In an interview with Moscow television on June 23, 1990, he demanded that, "Those structures within the KGB...that prepare and disseminate disinformation both inside and outside the country,
must be disbanded.” He was asked, “You mentioned the service engaged in disinformation — how great are that service’s capabilities?” Kalugin answered, “It has very great capabilities, very great.”

One of the most effective Soviet active measures is the use of agents of influence—individuals used covertly to inject Soviet-favored views into government, political, journalistic, business, labor and academic circles of foreign countries. While the term “agent of influence” is normally used for individuals engaged in influence operations rather than those who collect intelligence, in some cases the same agents are used for both. KGB officers usually run these operations, but Soviet journalists, academicians and other officials may play a role as well.

The KGB uses several terms to characterize different types of Soviet relationships with non-Soviets used in influence operations. These terms are used loosely, and the relationships vary from case to case in the extent of cooperation involved, the degree of leverage or control the Soviets are able to exert, the frequency of contact and the type of reward received by the agent. Rewards range from financial payments to such intangible benefits as publicity of the collaborator’s accomplishments or the promise of special channels of communication to the Kremlin. The latter is particularly effective with those Western leaders who possess excessive egos.

Three of the terms used by the KGB in reference to agents of influence are:

A controlled agent of influence is a foreigner who has actually been recruited by the KGB. Often this individual is developed an agent in his youth and later achieves prominence. The KGB often, but not always, provides financial assistance.

Once the individual has been recruited, he may not be contacted again until he has reached a position of importance.

A trusted relationship is one between a foreigner and a Soviet who may or may not be an intelligence officer. The extent to which the foreigner—called a “trusted contact”—cooperates with the Soviets ranges from very limited to complete cooperation. The foreigner may even believe that he is benefiting his own country rather than the Soviet Union.

A special contact is an individual who maintains a relationship with the KGB in a country where active KGB recruitment of agents is constrained by political considerations. Although the special contact does not receive a regular salary from the KGB, the relationship is often reinforced by gifts and other forms of attention.

The motivations of non-Soviets whom Moscow regards as agents of influence or special contacts can vary widely. Some individuals cooperate with the Soviets basically because they are flattered by Soviet attention and favors. Others cooperate out of fear. A time-honored KGB practice is to compromise foreigners visiting the USSR so as to make them vulnerable to blackmail later. Still other individuals cooperate largely because of ideological compatibility or because their own tactical political objectives coincide with those of the Soviets. In addition, some foreign leaders may find it convenient to maintain a tie to the KGB in the belief that it serves as an effective channel for expressing views to Moscow.
The Soviets also use people who are not in any way under their control but who think that they are serving the interest of their own country by carrying Soviet messages to high-level officials and policymakers. These agents of influence usually tell the recipient that the message comes directly from top level Soviets. The recipient is supposed to be impressed by the fact that the Soviets have used a back channel to reach him.

One classic case took place in the early 1960s. The KGB officer was Georgi Bolshakov. Although operating in the United States as a representative of the Soviet Novosti Press Agency, he was actually a high-level official of KGB. His target was the President of the United States, John F. Kennedy. His conduit was the president’s brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. Writing in the October 1989 issue of the theoretical journal for communists in the Soviet military, Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (Communist of the Armed Forces), Bolshakov boasted of his connections decades earlier. According to Bolshakov, President Kennedy “was trying to expand the information channels to the Soviet leadership on his ‘New Frontiers policy’ that required that each of his aides have ‘his own Russian in Washington.’” According to Bolshakov, Robert Kennedy agreed that the KGB officer would be a direct communications link between Khrushchev and President Kennedy. He quoted Bobby Kennedy as saying, “We should, in using this channel of communication, speak directly and candidly, and not resort to the usual propaganda tricks of politicians. Our mutual understanding can only gain from that.”

Bobby Kennedy was so naive that he thought that Khrushchev was acting on his own without staff support in these contacts. On one occasion when Kennedy did not like something that Bolshakov reported, he interrupted him, saying, “Georgie, skip that. Gromyko’s people wrote that, not Khrushchev. It’s all clear. Better to tell me right away the places that were written by Khrushchev. It is important that we know his opinion, his thoughts, the same way that he clearly wants to know the thoughts of my broker.”

During the Cuban missile crisis Bolshakov brought a message from Khrushchev that no offensive nuclear missiles had been sent to Cuba. President Kennedy knew this was a lie because the aerial photographs showed the construction of the missile sites. Bobby Kennedy sent a set of the photographs through a mutual friend to show Bolshakov why they knew he was lying. The photographs still bore the caption, “For The President’s Eyes Only.”

On October 25, 1962, Khrushchev publicly admitted that he had sent the nuclear missiles to Cuba. Despite Bolshakov’s loss of credibility, on October 27th he received a call from President Kennedy’s assistant, Kennon O’Donnell, asking him whether the anti-aircraft missiles in Cuba were under the control of Cubans or Soviets. The reason for the question was that a U-2 reconnaissance plane had been shot down over Cuba by a Soviet missile. Bolshakov answered that they were under the control of the Soviets. His answer was confirmed by Moscow.

The Bolshakov channel was soon closed down and he returned to Moscow.

The Kennedys were very angry. Robert Kennedy wrote in his posthumously published memoir of the missile crisis:

During this same period of time, an important official in the Soviet Embassy, returning from Moscow, brought me a personal message from Khrushchev to President Kennedy, stating that he wanted
the President to be assured that under no circumstances would surface-to-surface missiles be sent to Cuba.

Now, as the representatives of the CIA explained the U-2 photographs that morning, Tuesday, October 16, we realized that it had all been lies, one gigantic fabric of lies. The Russians were putting missiles in Cuba, and they had been shipping them there and beginning the construction of the sites at the same time those various private and public assurances were being forwarded by Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy.

Thus the dominant feeling was one of shocked incredulity. We had been deceived by Khrushchev, but we had also fooled ourselves.4

Bolshakov returned to Moscow where he served as Deputy Chairman of the Novosti Press Agency and the head of its film department. His work for the KGB continued.

Having compromised the Bolshakov back channel by being caught in a lie, the Soviets developed a new one. On October 26th, Alexander Fomin (real name Alexander Feklisov), the KGB Resident in Washington, contacted the State Department correspondent for ABC, John Scali, and invited him to lunch. He asked Scali to serve as a conduit for a Soviet offer to solve the missile crisis. The Soviets would remove the missiles if the U.S. would lift their blockade and pledge not to invade Cuba.5

Scali, a patriotic American, dutifully transmitted the message which became the basis for easing the crisis. It succeeded because the Soviets achieved their aim — an American pledge that protected Castro’s Cuba, the Soviets’ unsinkable aircraft carrier. From the U.S. point of view we were back to the status quo of no Soviet missiles in Cuba. A net gain for the Soviet Union.

What the Kennedy Administration did not understand was the reason that the Soviets prefer back channels. Bolshakov, in his 1989 articles, explained why they are so valuable. Complaining that the Kennedys considered him a liar, Bolshakov wrote:

It is painful for me to think about the fact that both Robert Kennedy and other people considered me a liar in the matter, people who sincerely wanted rapprochement with our country and who, like me, were working hard to achieve this rapprochement.

The “secret channel” of personal communication between Kennedy and Khrushchev was set up and operated essentially for this purpose. Such rapprochement was a new form of relations between the leaders of our two powerful states, in which the personal “I” dominated, ruling out to a certain degree the possibility of their being pressured by opposing forces (the State Department, the Pentagon, the CIA and others). The “channel” permitted the two leaders openly to lay out problems, thereby understanding each other better.

Elsewhere in the articles Bolshakov reiterated, “The Pentagon, the State Department and the CIA could not exert influence on that channel.”6

This is the central Soviet objective of establishing back channels. The Soviets know that when the Presi-
dent or other policymaker serves as his own desk officer and ignores the normal analysis of information by the foreign policy community, he plays into Soviet hands. The Soviets are able to determine what information he has and how they can manipulate his perceptions. It didn't work in the Cuban missile crisis because the aerial photography proved the KGB officer, Bolshakov, to be a liar. However, it has worked in other cases.

The Soviets are fully aware of the danger of policymakers making decisions without the input of the analysts, even though Western intelligence services do not have the opportunity to influence Soviet officials the way the KGB can influence Western officials. KGB Chairman Kryuchkov in an interview with Pravda complained, "Many of our troubles and hardships are the result of the fact that in the past the country's top leaders often adopted decisions on the basis of their own subjective perception and evaluation of the situation and failed to take into account the real sentiments, interests and aspirations of the people. In the present situation in the world and in this country, the KGB cannot allow itself to be engaged in wishful thinking."

Kryuchkov explained why KGB input was so important to the Soviet policymaker: "Like a number of other ministries and departments, the KGB has at its disposal information which is necessary for the country. It is quite understandable that the security bodies possess classified information on various questions. This information is obtained through intelligence and counter-intelligence sources. The KGB's analytical services generalize and analyze both open and secret information, compare both types of information, give assessments and draw corresponding conclusions. This makes our activities in this field truly unique."

Just as the Soviets continue to use agents of influence under KGB control, they also continue to use unwitting dupes as back channel conduits to American policymakers. From the beginning George Bush has been extremely soft on the Soviets on the issue of Lithuania. But even his mild complaints were more than the Soviets could stand. On March 30, 1990, the Washington Post reported:

President Bush decided to take a low-key approach to the confrontation between Lithuania and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev this week after receiving private reports from Americans visiting Moscow that Gorbachev is under intense pressure at home to take a hard line toward the secessionist republic, administration officials said yesterday.

The messages were from Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), who met with Gorbachev on Monday, and the retired chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, William J. Crowe Jr., who visited with other senior Soviet officials in Moscow, the U.S. officials said. Even before they returned home, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow conveyed their views to Bush.

Soviet leaders are so concerned about the U.S. reaction that Gorbachev's new presidential council, or cabinet, spent much of its seven-hour first meeting Tuesday discussing American opinion, Kennedy was told by KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov, who is a member of the
council.

Administration officials said Bush also was influenced by cables received from Crowe after his meetings with Soviet officials. Crowe cautioned that the Soviets were deeply concerned about the Lithuanian independence drive and that the Baltic republic was “something that would not be let go,” said an official familiar with the message.

President Bush, as the Washington Post pointed out, was influenced by Kennedy and Crowe to be even softer on the issue of Lithuania. Kennedy reflected the influence of KGB Chief Kryuchkov who briefed him. When the President acts as his own desk officer and makes decisions based on back channel information, the result is of benefit to the Soviet Union. In this case, however, while the president did what the Soviets wanted, it may not end up as the Soviets anticipate. Bush Administration softness encouraged Soviet toughness. It may be that the Soviet actions against Lithuania will make it difficult for the U.S. Senate to ratify agreements that are much more important to Gorbachev.

Agents of influence operations have a long history. Richard Sorge was a German communist who functioned as a legendary Soviet military intelligence officer in Japan during World War II. Sorge built a significant network of agents that penetrated high levels of the Japanese government and society. To limit the danger that the closed society of imperial Japan offered to his agents, Sorge had been forbidden by Moscow to engage in “non-intelligence activity,” which meant that he should not try to influence the political situation in Japan. Political influence operations, now called active measures by the Soviets, have a long tradition; but during the 1930s they were primarily the work of Comintern intelligence rather than military intelligence.

Sorge, who learned his trade in the Comintern, decided that there were many opportunities to influence Japanese elite opinion in a pro-Soviet direction. The opportunities were too good to miss. In 1941 he asked Moscow whether it would be permissible to have Ozaki, a member of his group with very high-level connections, promote the idea of a peace policy toward the Soviet Union. Ozaki, according to Sorge, “was confident that if he took a strong stance toward a Soviet-Japanese war in the Konoye Group, he could turn Japanese expansion policy southward” (i.e., against the United States). Moscow’s response was negative, saying that this was unnecessary. Sorge construed its response as not banning the activity. He therefore encouraged Ozaki to promote that line.8

Claud Cockburn was a member of the British Communist Party and a Comintern propagandist before World War II. He edited a newsletter called The Week, which disseminated Soviet propaganda and disinformation. This publication was suppressed by the British government in 1940 because of the damage it did to the war effort.9 As the Soviets and Nazis were allied at that time, The Week did its best to undermine the British government’s efforts.

In his autobiography, Cockburn describes a disinformation operation that he conducted during the Spanish Civil War on behalf of Willy Muenzenberg’s Comintern propaganda apparatus. Cockburn was meeting in Paris with Muenzenberg’s right hand man, Otto Katz. Katz suggested that Cockburn write an “eye witness account” of a revolt behind Franco’s lines. No such revolt had taken place and Cockburn had never been in the town that Katz
mentioned. Katz explained that that wasn't the point. A crucial battle was about to take place and vital arms for the Spanish Republicans were being held up in France. Katz wanted the story of the revolt to be printed in the French press so it could be used by a delegation that was visiting Leon Blum, the head of the French government, to urge him to release the weapons. Cockburn wrote an extensive, if false, story about the nonexistent revolt, naming nonexistent officers who led it, complete with details of street fighting. According to Cockburn, "In the end it emerged as one of the most factual, inspiring and yet sober pieces of war reporting I ever saw, and the night-editors loved it. When the deputisation saw Blum in the morning he had been reading it in newspaper after newspaper and appreciating its significance. He was receptive to the deputation's suggestions. The guns got through all right, and the Republicans won that battle."  

Harry Dexter White, a high official of the U.S. Treasury Department in the Roosevelt Administration, was identified by Whittaker Chambers as well as by Elizabeth Bentley as a Soviet agent. He died of a heart attack before Chambers produced copies of secret U.S. government documents in White's own handwriting that proved that he was a Soviet spy.

White was a tremendous influence on his boss, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Some historians credit White with the idea of the so-called Morgenthau plan, announced during World War II, to turn postwar Germany into a pasture. It is argued that this threat prolonged the war with Germany long enough to guarantee the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe.

One of White's friends, a former Treasury Department colleague, Fred Smith, wrote an article that appeared in United Nations World, March 1947, in which he told the story of the Morgenthau Plan. According to Smith, a meeting was held on August 7, 1944, in southern England. General Dwight Eisenhower, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau and Morgenthau's two assistants, Harry Dexter White and Fred Smith, were there. White complained that the Allied troops were under orders to reestablish the German economy as they conquered parts of Nazi Germany. White thought this was wrong and that no help should be given to the people. Eisenhower agreed and said he thought that the Germans needed punishment. He said, "I am not interested in the German economy and personally would not like to bolster it if that would make it any easier for the Germans." Eisenhower claimed that those who wanted to let Germany "off easy" really wanted to strengthen Germany as a potential bulwark against Russia. Eisenhower opposed that view of the future and suggested that it was necessary to be "good and hard" on the Germans and to take no step to help them. White responded, "We may want to quote you on the problem of handling the German people." Eisenhower agreed that they could quote him and said, "I will tell the President myself if necessary." According to Smith, "From that moment, Morgenthau's chief interest in life" was the creation of a plan "that would forever prevent the German people from making war."

It was clear that White played a major role in encouraging Morgenthau to develop a plan that terrified the Germans, and may very well have lengthened the war. While it benefitted the Soviets to keep the war going, it cost countless additional American, British, German and other lives.

Donald Downes served as a high ranking officer of the World War II Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor of CIA. In his post-war memoirs, he described how, "In the early summer of 1942, there was
great excitement" at OSS headquarters "when the battle listening post for Russian ships (Russia was still a neutral in the Pacific war) reported that American machine-tools, loaded as supposedly lease-lend or Russia, were being delivered in Jap ports, apparently to make airplanes and tanks to be used against American soldiers. We were ordered on 'highest authority': drop the subject; make no record of it. When it seemed this might cause a small OSS mutiny, we were finally given an explanation. The Japs were exchanging rubber, real, crude Malaya rubber, in return. Without rubber the Russian armies could not fight on. Our supply experts felt that rubber was more important than in the Battle of Europe than the machine tools were in the Battle of the Pacific."11

We don't know who the "highest authority" was who felt that the Soviet war effort was more important than saving American lives. Downes does not tell us. That he was quite naive about Soviet infiltration of the American government can be seen in the same book where he describes the time that he was assigned to work for Lauchlin Currie, one of President Roosevelt's administrative assistants. Downes reported having access to much of the secret information and plans which crossed his desk." According to Downes, "After the war when I heard Congressional Committees etouling him with all sorts of synthetic congressional natures, it first made me laugh and then made me sad. To label level-headed, hard money Currie a Communist is fantastic."12

Whatever Currie's economic views were, he was identified by Elizabeth Bentley as a source of highly classified information to the Soviet spy ring for which he worked. Currie denied the charges, but later fled to South America.13 Since then additional information was developed which tends to corroborate Bentley's story. One such incident was revealed when FBI files on the Amerasia espionage case became available under the Freedom of Information Act. Six persons, including the editors of the communist magazine Amerasia, were arrested on June 6, 1945, on espionage charges when the government learned that they were stealing and photocopying highly classified documents. Within a few months the charges had been dropped against some, and others pleaded guilty to such reduced charges that they were fined rather than given jail sentences. Why this happened became apparent through examination of the FBI wire tape records on Thomas Corcoran, a well-known wheeler-dealer and influence peddler during the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations. Corcoran was contacted by Currie who asked if he could do something on the side to take care of this case. After a meeting with Currie at the White House, Corcoran began a series of telephone calls pressuring the Justice Department and the U.S. Attorney to drop the case. He succeeded.14 Not all agents of influence are either communists or naive. The corrupt "fixer" Corcoran did the job for the influential White House official with Soviet connections, and the espionage case was derailed.

The full story of the Soviet penetration of the New Deal has yet to be written. Many New Deal officials served as Soviet agents of influence; only some were fully recruited agents under Soviet control. One who was, Alger Hiss, sat at Roosevelt's side during Yalta. He went to jail for perjury when he denied under oath the charge that he was a Soviet agent. The Soviet intelligence officer who ran Hiss during World War II has been identified as Iskhak Abdulovich Akhmerov. The identification was made by the former Soviet intelligence officer, Oleg Gordievsky, who served as a British double agent for over a decade while rising in KGB ranks until he
became the Rezident in London.

Gordievsky had attended a lecture at a KGB training course given by Akhmerov. After identifying Hiss, Akhmerov identified the most important of all the Soviet agents in the Roosevelt Administration. He devoted most of his lecture to this man, Harry Hopkins, the close friend and advisor to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

The first public exposure of Hopkins as a Soviet agent appeared in the book that Gordievsky co-authored with the British academic, Christopher Andrew, but his role in aiding the Soviet cause had been known for many years. Despite Gordievsky’s clear report identifying Hopkins as an agent, he became convinced in discussion with his co-author that Hopkins was an unconscious rather than a conscious agent. Co-author Andrew went so far as to write that Hopkins “was an American patriot.”¹⁵ The evidence paints quite a different picture.

Major George Racey Jordan of the United States Air Corps served as liaison officer with the Soviets at Great Falls, Montana, a major staging base for the shipment of Lend-Lease supplies to the Soviet Union. He kept a diary recording the usual and some very unusual experiences he had with the Soviets. One notation in his diary shocked him years later when he realized its significance. He then turned it over to a congressional investigating committee. He made the note while looking through a package of maps that were being shipped to the Soviet Union. One was a map of a place that he had never heard of in 1943. The map was of Oak Ridge and had a note attached which read, “Had a hell of a time getting these away from Groves. H.H.” The note was on White House stationery and from his conversation with the Russians he realized it came from President Roosevelt’s advisor Harry Hopkins. It was only years later that he realized that Oak Ridge was the site of our atom bomb project, which was headed by Gen. Groves.¹⁶ The Soviets frequently phoned Hopkins when they needed something done quickly. On one occasion, the Soviets phoned their embassy in Washington and turned the phone over to Jordan saying that Harry Hopkins was on the other end. Hopkins told him to expedite a certain shipment for the Soviets and to say nothing about it, even to his superior officers. Investigation later revealed that the shipment contained uranium.¹⁷ At the time that Hopkins was shipping the maps of Oak Ridge and uranium, the Russians weren’t even suppose to know that we were trying to develop an atom bomb or what materials were being used in it.

Lt. General Leslie R. Groves, the former head of the World War II atom bomb project, testified before the UnAmerican Activities Committee that he had resisted the shipment of atom materials to the Soviet Union. The Lend-Lease Administration, which was run by Hopkins, kept the pressure on to make the
shipments. He said, “we didn’t want this material shipped, yet they kept coming back and coming back.”

Whittaker Chambers, who broke with the Soviet espionage service, identified Lee Pressman as a member of the Soviet ring with Alger Hiss. This was a top-level group whose members were involved in recruiting others to the Communist underground. Pressman invoked the Fifth Amendment when confronted by his accuser in 1948. In 1950, Pressman reappeared before the Committee and admitted being a member of the Communist group. He denied involvement in espionage but avoided discussing any matters that the Committee might not already know. Pressman was also a member of a small leftist group in the Department of Agriculture in the fall of 1933. Hopkins was a member of the group. The other members of the group signed their names to numerous Communist front petitions. Hopkins did not. Perhaps he was trying to conceal an affiliation that had begun as early as 1933.

During World War II, Hopkins demanded that the War Department send Colonel Philip R. Faymonville back to the Soviet Union to assist in the Lend-Lease effort. Faymonville, who had served in Russia from 1933 to 38, was looked upon as a leftist. Army intelligence objected to his return to the Soviet Union. Hopkins responded, “You might as well get his papers ready, because he’s going over.” Faymonville was sent to Moscow. Yuri Rastvorov, a defector from Soviet intelligence, testified before the United States Senate on February 8, 1956. He revealed that Soviet intelligence had attempted to recruit Faymonville during his World War II service in Moscow. The Soviets blackmailed him with their knowledge of his homosexual activities. Rastvorov said he thought that the approach was unsuccessful, but there is considerable evidence that Faymonville acted on behalf of the Soviet Union.

Hopkins had gone to the Soviet Union in July 1941 on behalf of President Roosevelt. He met with Stalin, who impressed him very much. President Truman sent him back to Moscow in May 1945. Again he met with Stalin. It was on this occasion that he undermined the American position in opposition to the Soviet domination of Poland. The U.S. government had demanded free elections in Poland. The official minutes of the Stalin-Hopkins meeting, taken by Assistant Secretary of State Charles Bohlen, revealed that Hopkins as the President’s representative told Stalin “that the United States would desire a Poland friendly to the Soviet Union and in fact desired to see friendly countries all along the Soviet borders. Marshall Stalin replied, if that be so we can easily come to terms in regard to Poland.”

The sell-out of Poland was a major victory for the Soviets. Hopkins also did a number of small favors for them. Not all of his efforts were successful. In April 1944, Victor Kravchenko defected to the United States from the Soviet Union. Hopkins was furious. He went
to President Roosevelt to demand that Kravchenko be sent back. Roosevelt responded that it might be easier to return Kravchenko if the Soviets promised not to shoot him. Kravchenko was not returned. He survived to write his classic book, I Chose Freedom.

The relationship of Hopkins to Roosevelt was described by the biographer Robert E. Sherwood: “During the years when Harry Hopkins lived as a guest in the White House, he was generally regarded as a sinister figure, a backstairs intriguer, an Iowa combination of Machiavelli, Svengali and Rasputin. Hostility toward him was by no means limited to those who hated Franklin Delano Roosevelt. There were many of Roosevelt’s most loyal friends and associates, in and out of the Cabinet, who disliked Hopkins intensely and resented the extraordinary position of influence and authority which he held.”

W. Averell Harriman was American Ambassador to the Soviet Union during the latter half of World War II and for some time after. In October 1945, Harriman was concerned that the aggressive actions of the Soviet Union would split the alliance. As if by accident a man from his past appeared to Harriman to answer his concerns. Harriman had met George Andreychin in 1926. Andreychin was Leon Trotsky’s interpreter when Harriman met with him. Visiting Harriman at Spaso House, the Ambassador’s residence, Andreychin told him that they must speak in secret. Dramatically, they went into the bathroom and turned on the water to prevent the microphones of the Soviet secret police from picking up their conversation. Andreychin then told Harriman precisely what the Soviets wanted Harriman to believe. The West, he explained, should not take seriously the Soviet Union’s aggressive behavior. The reason was the Soviets’ inferiority complex. After being filled with great pride as result of its military victories, the Kremlin was shocked and dis-
as communists, mainly because of their greater credibility and operational freedom.

Arne Treholt, head of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry Press and Information Office, was convicted in June 1985 and sentenced to 20 years for working as a Soviet agent from 1974 until his arrest in January 1984. Treholt had first come into contact with the Soviets in 1967 when he was a young political activist and journalist, but was not activated as an agent until he became a secretary to Jens Evensen, the Norwegian Minister for Trade and Shipping. Subsequently he served as an embassy counselor at Norway’s UN Delegation in New York and spent a year as a student at Norway’s Defense College.

Treholt was convicted primarily for his espionage work for the Soviets, but he also had substantial opportunity to influence Norwegian policy. For example, he played an important role in the 1970s negotiations between Norway and the USSR on delimitation of the continental shelf of the Barents Sea, and he had a hand in the gray-zone fisheries agreement between the two countries. The fisheries agreement that Treholt helped to negotiate was later criticized as biased toward the USSR. During this period, Evensen also resurrected the concept of a “Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone,” a favorite Soviet theme in arms control propaganda.

Treholt’s KGB control officer was General Gennadiy Titov. The KGB officer remained silent until he provided an interview with the Oslo newspaper, Arbeiderbladet, on May 3, 1990. Titov denied that Treholt was involved in espionage but claimed that his secret meetings with Treholt, some of them in third countries, were merely for the purpose of two friends discussing political issues. He admitted that one of his meetings came at a time when the Soviet Union was concerned about Western attitudes on the deployment of the Soviet SS20 missiles and the invasion of Afghanistan.

According to Titov, “I had my views and Treholt had his. But we agreed that we would do — each on his own side — everything we could to avoid a nuclear conflict.” Titov claimed that he was so impressed with Treholt that, “I was quite able to see him as a future foreign minister, perhaps even a prime minister.” When asked about the fact that in Treholt’s notebook, he was identified by the cover name “Henry,” Titov answered, “Gennady is the Russian form of Henry.” Actually Genrikh is the Russian form of Henry. Titov was of course lying to protect his valuable agent of influence and source of secret documents.

While the Treholt case is the most infamous recent one involving a high-level official, a number of other Soviet agents have been in positions where they could influence their governments’ policies. One example was Hirohide Ishide—a former Japanese labor minister, Liberal Democratic Party member of the Japanese Diet and head of a front organization, the Dietmen’s League for Japan-Soviet Friendship. He retired in 1983 after being publicly identified by former KGB officer Stanislav Levchenko as a Soviet agent of influence. One example of Ishide’s promotion of Soviet interests occurred when Victor Belenko larded his Soviet MiG-25 in Japan in 1976. According to Levchenko, Ishide, under KGB instructions, lobbied the Prime Minister and his cabinet colleagues to return the plane to the USSR without examining it.

Said Ghouse, political secretary to Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister, was arrested in 1981—shortly before his boss became Prime Minister—and subsequently convicted as Soviet agent. The Malaysian Government also expelled three Soviet Embassy officers accused of recruiting Ghouse. Ghouse would have been well positioned within the Prime Minister’s office if he had not been identified.

The KGB has also been active in recruiting agents
within major opposition parties. One of the apparently more successful of these operations was its penetration of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the largest opposition party in Japan. The JSP has been particularly attractive to the Soviets because of its long-standing antinuclear positions. According to Levchenko, during the 1970s the KGB had more than 10 agents of influence within the JSP—including several members of the Japanese Diet—and through them could control the party’s political platform. KGB influence over the party probably has waned since then because of Levchenko’s revelations and the JSP’s move toward the political center to improve its popularity. However, several individuals who were publicly identified by Levchenko as “trusted contacts” continue to participate in JSP affairs.

The Soviets have also sought to penetrate peace and antinuclear groups—particularly in Western Europe—to put pressure on their governments. In 1983, a Soviet second secretary was expelled from West Germany. He had been trying to enlist agents to influence the West German antinuclear movement. During the same year, the Swiss Government expelled the director and closed the USSR’s Bern-based Novosti bureau, charging that it had been used as a center for the “political and ideological indoctrination” of young members of the Swiss peace and antinuclear movements.

The Soviets also give high priority to recruitment of foreign journalists who can help shape the opinions both of elite audiences and of the general public. The KGB uses these individuals to place articles, including disinformation and forgeries, to influence the editorial line of newspapers and to publish special letters. KGB officers normally meet with their press assets to give them guidance on what to write and frequently provide financial support. The Soviets have been particularly adept at penetrating and manipulating the media in the Third World, but they have also had some significant successes in the more sophisticated press of Western Europe and Japan.

One of the best known cases is that of Pierre-Charles Pathe, a French journalist convicted in 1979 of acting as a Soviet agent since 1960. The Soviets provided funds to Pathe so he could publish a private newsletter, and they reviewed his articles—which pushed the Soviet line on a wide range of international issues—prior to publication. The subscribers to Pathe’s newsletter included almost 70 percent of the members of the French Chamber of Deputies and almost 50 percent of France’s Senators.33

Another important agent of influence was Danish journalist Arne Herlov Peterson, who was arrested in 1981 and charged with carrying out illegal activities for the USSR. Although he was not convicted, the Danish government made available evidence that Peterson was recruited several years earlier by the KGB. He served the Soviets by publishing Soviet-supplied anti-NATO propaganda tracts, conveying funds to peace organizations and disseminating Soviet-prepared forgeries. Peterson received gifts, free travel and cash payments from the Soviet Embassy.34

Levchenko revealed that in Japan the KGB had agents in most of the major newspapers and media outlets. One of them, the editor of one of the largest newspapers in Japan, resigned in 1983 after being publicly identified as a Soviet agent. He had been involved in a number of Soviet active measures, including the surfacing of the forged “last will and testament of Chou En-lai”—an operation considered by the KGB to have been very successful. Other media assets continue to promote Soviet interests in Japan. For instance, one journalist identified by Levchenko as a “trusted contact” published a story in 1984 support-
ing the Soviet version of the KAL shutdown.

The Australian journalist Wilfred Burchett, who died in Sofia, Bulgaria in 1983, often denied the charge that he was a Soviet agent of influence. After his death, the Australian academic Robert Manne gained access to Burchett's letters to his family and some of the Australian government security files. Taken together they proved that Burchett had acted on behalf of the Soviet Union and other communist countries and had received payment for this activity.  

Burchett's writings were regularly published in The Guardian, a pro-communist newspaper published in New York. In 1979, Burchett wrote to the newspaper severing his connection. The Guardian had supported the People's Republic of China and Kampuchea against Soviet-supported Vietnam. He wrote, "It is with great sorrow that I write all this. But some of the things which you have done are simply incomprehensible. You let Vietnam down in one of the moments of her greatest need...."
When Burchett visited the United States in 1977, he was greeted by an honoring committee organized by the National Lawyers Guild. The three leaders of the committee were: Jane Fonda, attorney Leonard Wineglass and actor Ossie Davis. Other members of the committee included attorneys William Kunstler, Mark Lane and Arthur Kinoy and entertainers John Randolph, Dick Gregory and Ruby Dee. (See the invitation reprinted on page 27.)

Albert Kahn was an American writer and member of the Communist Party. In 1945, Elizabeth Bentley, who had served as a courier for a Soviet spy ring, confessed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. One of the Soviet spies that she identified was Albert Kahn. She revealed that in 1942, although he was a member of a Communist Party unit and paid dues there, he also paid dues through Bentley. During those years, communists who were working for Soviet intelligence actually had to pay for the privilege. Most of today’s spies are paid by the Soviets. Bentley said that Kahn was editing a weekly newsletter and was also involved in writing books.\[37\]

The newsletter was called The Hour. It appeared weekly from April 30, 1939 until May 20, 1943. Osten-sibly an anti-Nazi publication, it frequently carried Soviet disinformation. For almost a year, Kahn’s name was not publicly associated with the newsletter. He first appeared on the masthead in March 1940 and he was finally identified as editor in September 1940. Both Kahn and his close collaborator Michael Sayers used the newsletter to undermine American confidence in the British war effort and to promote the Soviet line on peace, despite the fact that the audience for the publication was anti-Nazi and should logically have supported British efforts. It was widely read by journalists and government officials.\[38\]

The Hour greeted the Soviet-Nazi Pact as a weapon to discredit Hitler in Germany. Despite the fact that the Pact allowed Hitler to start World War II and resulted in his conquest of half of Poland (the Soviets got the other half), according to The Hour the Pact was “the worst defeat that Nazism could have wished upon itself.”\[39\]

Kahn’s first book, written in 1942 with Michael Sayers, was titled Sabotage!, The Secret War Against America. Much of the book was devoted to an attack on the Ukrainian Nationalists in the United States who Kahn falsely accused of working for Nazi Germany during the war.

His second book, written in 1945 also with Sayers, was called The Plot Against the Peace. Its theme was that American conservatives were plotting with Nazi Germany for a third world war against the Soviet Union.

The third book, signed by the pair in 1946, was the worst of the lot. Called The Great Conspiracy, The Secret War Against Soviet Russia, it repeated every Stalinist fantasy ranging from accusing Trotsky of being a Nazi agent to accusing the United States of plotting the overthrow of the Soviet government, even during World War II.\[40\] Henry Wallace, former Vice President of the United States, Joseph Davies, former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union and other prominent people signed statements promoting these books and their disinformation.

The Communist Party USA conducted a major campaign to distribute The Great Conspiracy. It contained precisely the disinformation that the Soviet Union wanted distributed at that time. The Communist Party USA also issued a study guide to the book so that it could be used for training communist propa-
April 30, 1947.

TO ALL STATE AND DISTRICT SECRETARIES

Dear Comrades:

I am writing to inform you that the second edition of The Great Conspiracy by Michael B. Swirsky and Albert Kahn is now available in a new, revised and improved edition. This book provides important information about the activities of the Communist Party, the role of the international Communist movement, and the current situation in the United States.

The 25 cent price of this new pocket-book edition makes it possible to reach an audience of literally hundreds of thousands with this vital information. Today, it is more urgent than ever to get this material to the widest possible sections of the American people.

This new edition includes updated information and a new foreword. The foreword is written by a leading American journalist who has written extensively about the Communist movement in the United States.

Comrade Swirsky and I have worked hard to make this book as accurate and timely as possible. We believe that the information contained in it is essential for anyone who wants to understand the current situation in the United States.

Sincerely yours,

Michael B. Swirsky

C.P. headquarters instructs party members to distribute the Soviet disinformation book The Great Conspiracy by Soviet agent Albert Kahn.

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
WASHINGTON 25

MAY 17, 1948

Mr. Albert S. Kahn
245 West 25th Street, 1-E
New York City, New York

Dear Mr. Kahn:

I was pleased to receive your book, The Great Conspiracy. I have read it with great interest and find it to be a valuable contribution to understanding the political landscape of today.

I believe that it is important for all Americans to be aware of the activities of the Communist Party and the dangers it poses to our way of life. The information contained in your book is essential for understanding this threat.

I would be happy to help you in any way I can to promote the distribution of this book. Please let me know if there is anything I can do to assist you.

Sincerely yours,

Henry A. Wallace

Former Vice President Henry Wallace advises Soviet agent Albert Kahn that he uses The Great Conspiracy in his speeches.

gandists in the United States.41

In 1947 Albert Kahn organized the defense of Gerhart Eisler, who was being investigated by the United States Congress. Eisler was the Comintern representative to the Communist Party USA and had been involved in Soviet espionage for decades. In a
world were ordered to popularize the slogan, “Reagan means war” (pp 589-90).

For the next two years this theme was repeated by the Soviet active measures apparatus. In addition to the KGB covert active measures against Reagan, the overt active measures apparatus also carried the same theme. Alexander Bovin, now a great exponent of glasnost, used it in an interview with a Japanese newspaper Mainichi Shimbun on December 30, 1983. According to Bovin, if Reagan were re-elected, there would be no chance of any peace agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. In fact, as soon as Reagan was re-elected, the Soviets, realizing their deteriorating economic, military and political position, sued for peace. The present Soviet glasnost and perestroika are the result of Reagan’s firm defense position.

Much of the KGB disinformation is disseminated through surrogates. Among the best known of these are the Indian newspapers, Blitz and Patriot. A substantial number of the KGB forgeries circulated around the world appear in one or both of these newspapers. The European correspondent of Blitz is Kunhanandan Nair. He is the author of the 1986 book, Devil and His Dart, How the CIA is Plotting in the Third World. The book is filled with KGB disinformation stories, but Nair’s understanding of the United States is best understood when we read the following sentence in his book: “In November 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected President, and shortly after former CIA Director George Bush was appointed Vice President.”

The book contained a list of “Third World Leaders Assassinated by CIA or Proxy Agents.” The list started with “Burma’s first president Ong-San” (sic Aung San) who was assassinated before the CIA was established, and went all the way to Indira Gandhi. It goes without saying that the accusations that the CIA
murdered these people were false.

Nair is the co-author with Michael Opperskalski of a recent disinformation book published in West Germany with similar false accusations. Opperskalski is the author of some earlier books published in West Germany and filled with anti-CIA disinformation, much of it of Soviet origin. Opperskalski also serves as the West German correspondent of the Nicaraguan magazine *Soberania*. This publication regularly carries Soviet and Cuban disinformation.

Opperskalski is the editor of the magazine *Geheim*. This publication, which appears in West Germany, frequently carries Soviet disinformation themes. Its issue No. 3 for 1988 carried an article by David Truong, who served a jail sentence in the United States for espionage on behalf of the communist government of Vietnam. An English language edition of the publication, called *Top Secret*, is now published by Opperskalski for distribution in Africa. *Geheim* works closely with a network of publications in other countries that frequently carry Soviet disinformation themes, particularly directed against the CIA. These are: *Lobster* in Great Britain; *Intelligence Newsletter*, formerly *Intelligence/Parapolitics*, in France and *Covert Action Information Bulletin* in the United States.

The Soviet disinformation apparatus, which includes the KGB and parts of the Soviet propaganda apparatus, continues to work despite glasnost. The CIA has revealed that in the Novosti Press Agency’s Moscow headquarters a staff of 50 KGB officers are assigned to work full-time on disinformation. Novosti employs a network of local journalists throughout the world to spread the disinformation created by the KGB section. The USIA has reported that:

The United States Information Service (USIS) post in Lagos, Nigeria has uncov-
supposed writers were in fact not the real authors of the published articles. According to an official of Novosti who wants to remain anonymous, these articles are indeed written for Novosti by Soviets. They are then distributed to Soviet embassies all over the world. Here in Lagos, said the source, the ‘materials are handed out’ to these writers who regularly visit the information section. But they just ‘kill off’ the real authors and append their names and get them published ‘without editing.’ ‘Instead of rewriting and re-editing in your own English,’ the source said, ‘they just publish.’”

The article continued:

Although our anonymous source denied fervently that these writers “are not our paid agents and are not on our payroll and are not our staff,” he admitted that they do get a “bonus” (financial) when they successfully place any of the articles in the newspapers.


USIA also reproduced two identical articles, one in the Daily Star signed by Dr. Gleb Smirno, and the other in the Herald signed Eddy Eke. In earlier articles Eke identified himself as a writer for Novosti Press Agency.

The false story that the United States deliberately created the AIDS virus in a military laboratory was widely disseminated by KGB and other elements of the Soviet apparatus from 1985 to 1987. Under pressure from the Surgeon General of the United States, who threatened to cut off medical information on AIDS if the Soviet Union continued spreading the false story, the Soviets repudiated the disinformation, and it stopped appearing in the Soviet media.

In June 1989, Novosti began spreading a new version of the disinformation story. The claim was that AIDS was inadvertently created by U.S. nuclear weapons tests (not Soviet nuclear tests, of course). The story was attributed to Dr. Lazar Mekler, a Soviet biologist. What Novosti failed to point out was that three months earlier TASS had interviewed this “scientist,” who does his research in his two-room apartment without any scientific equipment. Mekler told TASS that he could cure AIDS within a year if he were given a laboratory, two million dollars worth of equipment and a twenty-eight member staff. Mekler’s disinformation story was spread particularly in India and Africa. Perhaps it was too bizarre to use in Western Europe.

In addition to regular agent of influence operations, the Soviets establish other types of relationships to influence foreigners. For example, the KGB—along with the CPSU’s International Department—use Soviet academics to try to influence the ideas of their Western counterparts. Both the KGB and the ID play a role in selecting Soviet participants for foreign conferences, and Soviet delegates commonly receive guidance from the ID. The KGB hopes that Westerners will accept Soviets affiliated with “think tanks”—such as the Institute of the USA and Canada of the
USSR Academy of Science—as bona fide nonpolitical colleagues, and that Westerners will underestimate the extent to which these individuals are operating under official control.

The USSR also uses Soviet citizens as “unofficial sources” to leak information to foreign journalists and to spread disinformation that Moscow does not want attributed directly. One of the most active of these individuals is Vitaliy Yevgeniyevich Lui—better known as Victor Louis—a Soviet journalist who several KGB defectors have identified as a KGB agent. He has leaked such newsworthy items as Khrushchev’s ouster, the imminent Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the reassignment of Marshall Ogarkov. He was also used to try to discredit the memoirs of Stalin’s daughter Svetlana and, more recently, to discredit Andrei Sakharov.

In one case, the Soviets through the Cubans ran a tiny Marxist-Leninist Party as an agent of influence. That party, the New Jewel Movement (NJM), had less than one hundred members but was the ruling party in Grenada. Having taken power in 1979 in a coup, the NJM became a member of the Socialist International but was ideologically in the Soviet camp.

On April 15, 1983, Maurice Bishop, the Prime Minister of Grenada, met in Moscow with Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andre Gromyko. Bishop made a presentation to Gromyko on the revolutionary situation in the Caribbean. A document found in Grenada after the liberation showed that Bishop told Gromyko that the best left progressive parties in the area were moving in a Marxist-Leninist direction, “but find it very difficult to exist. Of course it is part of our internationalist duty to assist these developments to the extent of our capacity. We hold organizational/ideological seminars twice yearly. 13 countries — 15 Parties. Even this limited assistance (i.e., airline tick-

ets, subsistence, etc., plus direct financial grants to left parties) amounts to well over EC$500,000.00 so far. This is in fact already beyond our abilities and it will grow in quantity as these organizations develop. The USSR needs to get involved in providing some material support — through the most appropriate channel, to ensure the survival and development of these progressive organizations.” Gromyko responded:

Your information will be of great help to us in orienting ourselves in relation to the main questions that you touched upon. I will convey this information personally to Comrade Andropov who incidentally sends his warmest greetings, as well as to all my Comrades in the Soviet leadership.

As regards the proposals that you put forward, we shall study them very carefully and after that whatever we can see it possible to do we shall do it to meet your requests.

What you said concerning the situation in your region and the general mood of the broad masses of the people in the Caribbean, the upsurge of the parties and groups, is on the whole in line with our own understanding made from afar. It is our opinion that this entire region is today boiling like a caldron. There has been an amassing of anti-imperialist sentiments over the last centuries and particularly in recent times, aimed at overthrowing colonialism. They are seeking to change the old order. One cannot say that the situation in any one country is the carbon copy of another, yet, one can discern a certain commonality in the region as a whole in
its striving for independence...

We are very interested in what you have to say about the seminars that you held with the progressive forces in the Caribbean. It has a very scientific and scholarly form. The imperialists will be hard-pressed to accuse you of conspirators who need to be crushed by armed force.

That is the sign of flexibility that you are showing in organizing such meetings. You seem to have chosen the right form and structure.

M.B. We also organize these meetings during large national day occasions when many other people are in Grenada.

A.G. Well that is further evidence of your flexibility. Whatever we can do to strengthen the ties with your party—we will do. If we are not up to the maximum possible, we shall have to look into the matter. We will try to scrutinize this matter under a microscope, if possible. Those who deal with our party relations will have the benefit of the record of this conversation and I am sure that they will make every effort to improve and broaden such talks.52

The Comrades responsible for Grenada in the International Section, have told me that they operate on the basis that the NJM is a 'communist party'...

Grenada's role in the world (region)

By itself, Grenada's distance from the USSR, and its small size, would mean that we would figure in a very minute way in the USSR's global relationships. Our revolution has to be viewed as a worldwide process with its original roots in the Great October Revolution. For Grenada to assume a position of increasingly greater importance, we have to be seen as influencing at least regional events. We have to establish ourselves as the authority on events in at least the English-speaking Caribbean, and be the sponsor of revolutionary activity and progressive developments in this region at least. At the same time, we have to develop and maintain normal state to state relations with our neighbours and concretely operationalize our good-neighbourliness policy. The twice per year meetings with the progressive and revolutionary parties in the region is therefore critical to the development of closer relations with the USSR. In order to keep both the Embassy and the Soviets informed of the outcome of such meetings, perhaps a good model would be for a member of the CC to pay a visit to the USSR after each such meeting. The mission of such a person could without difficulty be mixed with other activities. We must ensure though, that we become
the principal point of access to the USSR for all these groups, even to the point of having our Embassy serve as their representative while in the USSR. ...

Of all the regional possibilities, the most likely candidate for special attention is Surinam. If we can be an overwhelming influence on Surinam's international behaviour, then our importance in the Soviet scheme of things will be greatly enhanced. To the extent that we can take credit for bringing any other country into the progressive fold, our prestige and influence would be greatly enhanced. Another candidate is Belize. I think that we need to do some more work in that country.

Recommendations

1. Establish a system of informing the Soviets of the outcome of the meetings between NJM and the progressive parties in the region.
2. Maintain these party to party meetings.
3. Examine the possibility of concluding formal treaties of Friendship and co-operation with our neighbours.
4. Explore ways and means of influencing the international behaviour (voting at UN etc) of Surinam and Belize.\(^ {53}\)

The documents of the New Jewel Movement's Central Committee and Politburo show that Cuban Ambassador Julian Torres Rizo and his wife, American-born Gail Reed Rizo, played a major role in directing the NJM and the Government of Grenada. Julian Rizo, an officer of the Cuban Intelligence Service, which is controlled by the KGB, had met his wife when he was assigned to work with the Venceremos Brigade, groups of Americans who went to Cuba in the 1970s and early 80s supposedly to cut sugar cane. The Cubans used the opportunity to spot and assess those young Americans who might be available for recruitment. Gail Reed was active in the Brigade. In a speech made to one of the Brigade contingents, Julian Rizo told them, "...the first thing that a U.S. revolutionary must be convinced of is precisely the fact that he does come from a decadent society, that he comes from a society that must be destroyed. ..."\(^ {54}\)

A Cuban report on the training of the young Americans in the Venceremos Brigade revealed some of the questions that the students asked their Cuban instructors.

Susan wants to clear up some confused points of Marighela's "Mini-manual of urban guerrilla"; Bob would like to know how the Tupamaros function and organize themselves because "we could do the same in many cities of the United States"; a blond long-haired young man worries about "What actions could we carry out to cooperate with Latin American revolutionaries in their struggle against Yankee imperialism?"

Undoubtedly many of the young people of the Venceremos Brigade have gathered fundamental experiences during their brief stay in the Isle of Pines.\(^ {55}\)

After the murder of Maurice Bishop by his com-
rades in the NJM, American and Caribbean troops liberated Grenada. When Gail Reed Rizo was questioned by The New York Times about the murder of Bishop, she responded angrily, “The killing of Bishop is not authorized, not authorized.”

The Cubans were able to use the NJM as a communist trojan horse in the Socialist International. Documents found in the Grenada Archives show that under Cuban leadership a secret regional caucus was set up in the Socialists International. Among its purposes was “to neutralize forces within S.I. that are against us.” In one of the documents the Communist infiltrators revealed, “Our principal enemies are to be found among the parties of Soares and Horgo (sic, Longo) in Portugal and Italy respectively — the Social Democrats of the U.S.A. are also our sworn enemies.”

From February 28 to March 1, 1989, a meeting of the Latin American sections of the Socialist International took place in Panama. Notes on the meetings were prepared by the Grenadan official Unison Whitemen. He revealed that during the meeting Vernon Walters, then the U.S. roving ambassador and now the U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, appeared at the meeting to express the view of the United States government. Walters pointed to the arms supply by the Soviet Union and Cuba to the insurgents in El Salvador and suggested a peaceful settlement of the conflict. The secret communist group “as a means of defeating the . . . U.S. tactics” arranged for the S.I. conference to offer, “. . . the services of S.I. Chairman, Willi Brandt as mediator in the conflict. This initiative ensures that: the U.S. cannot propose someone favourable to their own interest. Brandt is sympathetic for the freedom fighters but the U.S. will have difficulty rejecting him for he is a Nobel Peace Prize winner with stature world wide. This counter tactic would therefore give the comrades time to carry on the mili-

tary and political struggle together.”

The liberation of Grenada exposed the Soviet use of the New Jewel Movement as an agent of influence in the Socialist International. However, since that time the Soviets have increased their overt and covert attempts to influence that organization.

The 18th Congress of the Socialist International took place in Stockholm in June 1989. A delegation from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union International Department headed by the First Deputy Chief of the Department, K. N. Brutents, attended the Congress and met with Brandt and leaders of other Socialist Parties. According to the Soviet press, “they discussed questions of developing contacts and constructive dialogue on problems of the day.” In a TASS interview Brutents said that the positions of the Soviet Communist Party and parties grouped in the Socialist International on many international issues are close or coincide.

When Oleg Gordievsky was interviewed by Swedish television on November 4, 1990, he spoke about an operation he conducted in the Socialist International. Gordievsky said, “I have never met a Swedish spy or agent apart from one person, who was a very special KGB-contact. You know him—Mr. Carlson (Bernt Carlson)... And Mr. Carlson, who was secretary general of the Socialist International in London was a ‘special unofficial contact’ of the KGB. And I was supposed to run him as such so I met him several times in London. He was useful because he shared information about backstage intrigues and events and who was important and who was less important. For example the KGB wanted to know about the Latin, the French, Italian and Spanish socialists, who were rivals of the socialists in the northern countries. For the KGB and the International Department (of the Central Committee of the CPSU) it was easier to influence
North European socialist parties but difficult to deal with South European parties. So they were very afraid of the Latin influence in the Socialist International. Mr. Carlson was just the person to tell everything about the balance of the two forces.

The united front and agents of influence are both designed to get a target to take an action beneficial to the Soviet Union. The Social Democrats have often been used by the Soviets through united front tactics. However, the Communists have little respect for them. According to Karl Radek at the Fourth Congress of the Communist International, the communists had to use the tactic of the united front, "when we are lacking the necessary strength." He pointed out that, "this road will not harm us, but the social-democrats...We have acted not on the desire to merge with the Scheidemanns (the Social Democrats), but in order to stifle them in our embrace."

Agents of influence, witting and unwitting, remain an important tool of Soviet active measures. As we have seen, agents of influence can be used to achieve Soviet goals in situations where military threat or diplomatic and other overt channels may not be as effective. As the Soviet Union changes its posture from achieving its goals through confrontation to achieving its goals through influence (active measures), agents of influence can be expected to play an even greater role.

The defenses against Soviet agent of influence operations are exposure and education. Agents of influence are the most vulnerable of Soviet intelligence agents, since they must maintain direct contact with their targets. The exposure of Soviet influence themes may help expose the agents. The education of policymakers and journalists on Soviet methods and themes will enable them to understand and resist agent of influence operations.

NOTES

10. Ibid., pp 140-142.
12. Ibid., p 169.
17. Ibid., pp 926, 1047-8.
18. Ibid., p 947.
20. Ibid., p 1023.