The US military continues to require new civilian expertise in the PSYOP/MISO area. For those of you who may be interested in career opportunities, be sure to have your resume and other related data posted on LinkedIn.com, and to join the PSYOP group, which requires permission. First, you must sign in. To find the PSYOP group, click on "Groups" at the toolbar on the top of the LinkedIn page, and then click on "Groups Directory" in the pull-down menu, type in PSYOP, and you know how to do the rest.
PSYOP group members get regular updates on job opportunities. All of you who are looking for good jobs should be on LinkedIn (but make sure your resumes don't read like propaganda sheets).
Today's posting contains the following job description. It's a pretty basic, entry-level position, but a good one to get your foot in the door and get deployed to Afghanistan. Some higher-level and more challenging positions have also beeen posted in the past week.
I am not connected with the contractor in any way, but am just passing this information to my students for their (your) edification:
Leonie, an international, woman-owned strategic communication company specializing in reaching target audiences in challenging locations with global media solutions including region-specific research and planning, worldwide media production and distribution, digital media and creative services, and cultural advisory services is looking for a qualified Strategic Communications Planner - Lines of Operations (LOO) - OCONUS. Requirements: • Understanding of Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) • Understanding PSYOP/MISO Planning process • Experience with PSYOP/MISO planning at the operational level • Demonstrated proficiency in both oral and written communications • Ability to prioritize, organize, and adapt planning to mission requirements • Ability to critically review and analyze issues in an vague, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment • MS Office: Word, PowerPoint, Excel and Outlook • Good listener and ability to translate loose guidance and meet desired effect of the client Education: • Bachelors or Masters degree in history, sociology, psychology, political science, etc. • CGSC or equivalent preferred • PSYOP/MISO Officers Qualification Course or FA30 IO Qualification Course Location: • Kabul, Afghanistan
Leonie Industries offers you the opportunity to join an innovative, well respected organization and collaborate with industry experts and exceptional individuals. We provide a competitive compensation and a generous benefits package.
To be considered for this exciting opportunity, please apply online via our website at http://www.leoindus.com/careers . Please provide a cover letter outlining your experience and salary expectations as you create your Leonie Industries profile.
Here's the list of your Wikipedia topics - almost complete. Nice job! Hope you take the opportunity to help one another keep your pages alive and kicking.
A number of your Wikipedia pages rank #1 on Google, and most rank in the top 20 of Google search results. This alone allows you to see the power and influence of what appears on Wikipedia.
Chinese Propaganda Against Falun Gong (Not a Wikipedia title, but some of the creator's work is on the Falun Gong page. For the creator's work, see Anti-Falun Gong Chinese Propaganda page, which is tagged as a "work in progress" page that may be incomplete or unreliable. Wikipedia tells the creator, "Finished? Submit the page!")
Soviet Pro-Arab Propaganda (flagged as being new and unreviewed, and should be tagged for cleanup; Wikipedia calls for creator of page to solicit feedback)
World War II and American animation (flagged as a personal essay and in need of being re-written in encyclopedic style; also needs references so as not to be seen as original research)
Topics from 2010 (links to come later; I'm going to the Commissary now)
Per our discussion in class, here is a PDF of a photocopy of MAJ Nidal Hasan's powerpoint presentation to his fellow soldiers, outlining his threat doctrine, long before he shot up Fort Hood. (See link at bottom of this posting.)
The photo at right is from a surveillance camera at a store that Hasan visited just before the shooting. Note that he is wearing traditional garb, in white, as he makes his rounds before his murder spree. Most Muslim men dressed this way do not go on killing sprees, but for a US Army officer to dress in such a manner while on post is highly irregular and should have been a red flag as an ideological statement.
In his powerpoint, Hasan defines "Islamist" in a way that both adherent and critic can largely agree with, that is, one who "advocates . . . Islamic political rule/Sharia law (i.e. No separation of Church and State)".
As such, an Islamist by definition cannot legally serve in the US Armed Forces, because he cannot fulfill his pledge to uphold and defend the US Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic. By definition, Islamism is incompatible with, and hostile to, the US Constitution.
This example is an easy means of identifying a threat doctrine.
The Hasan powerpoint is not required for the final exam, but is provided here because several of you had expressed interest: Download MAJ Hasan Slides
Networked warfare and Islamist extremist propaganda
Netwar pertains to information-age conflict on the low-intensity, social end of the spectrum in which networked actors, usually small non-state entities or even individuals, could operate conjointly against larger, more powerful targets.
Information technology has empowered networked organization versus hierarchical structures, enabling groups to conduct “statecraft” in a realm in diplomatic, security and military affairs previously reserved for states and trans-state organizations. Netwar creates a challenge for government policymakers, as well as a need to develop theories and strategies for counternetwar.
This class combines a look at netwar theory with a very intensive lecture on enemy Islamist extremist propaganda and political warfare campaigns surrounding the war on terrorism around the world and within the United States.
The class discusses: (a) structures, functions, methods and themes of netwar components to promote terrorist causes and frustrate U.S. counter-terrorism efforts; (b) reasons why the U.S. finds it so difficult to counter these networks; (c) security and intelligence shortcomings and requirements; (d) integration of political/information operations with kinetic counter-terrorism operations; and (e) and U.S. government approaches to counter terrorist netwar and propaganda.
The class also explores different messages and media of today’s terrorist propaganda.
For students in the Thursday political warfare class: There is much overlap with a similar lecture, but many differences as well.
David Ronfeldt and Armando Martinez, “A Comment on the Zapatista ‘Netwar,’” In Athena’s Camp, Chapter 16, pp. 369-391. For more on this, see David Ronfeldt, ed., The Zapatista Social Netwar in Mexico (RAND, 1999).
Extra: MAJ Nidal Malik Hasan's powerpoint. This is the powerpoint that MAJ Hasan, who attacked fellow soldiers at Fort Hood in 2009, gave as what should have been an official US Army medical presentation, in 2007.
Chinese Propaganda and Perceptions Management Efforts
This class studies the development of the perceptions management theory and practice of the People’s Republic of China toward the United States and other Western countries from the 1970s to the present. We will discuss how Beijing shed old propaganda theory for a new, sophisticated approach among decision-making elites and in the population at large; and how the US has found it difficult to identify and counter such operations.
The PRC government has managed to gain influence footholds in both US political parties. We'll also see how the PRC induced a major US defense contractor to serve as an agent of influence.
Required Readings
Ellul, Propaganda, Appendix II, “Mao Tse-tung’s Propaganda.”
James Mann, About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (Knopf, 1999), pp. 241-245. This is a unique story of how a single political operative can successfully counter a Chinese propaganda effort. [The library copy of this book has "disappeared," so I will bring handouts of this short section for us to go over in class.]
Edward Timperlake and William C. Triplett II, Year of the Rat (Regnery, 2000). This book, written by a former military officer-turned-congressional investigator and a former counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, documents Chinese government penetration of US politics in a case study of the Clinton administration. Above, Mann writes about how Triplett acted as a one-man counterpropaganda team in the Senate against the PRC.
Frederick T. C. Yu, Mass Persuasion in communist China (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964). Studies the early domestic propaganda operations of the Chinese Communist Party to consolidate control over the population in the decade after its seizure of power.
Forgeries and disinformation can be successful tools of propaganda. The Soviets used them extensively, with varying degrees of success. Using mostly Soviet historical examples, this class explores how forgeries and disinformation were intended to influence US and other public opinion and/or decision-making, and how they succeeded or failed. The professor will use copies of actual Soviet KGB forgeries in illustrating the cases.
We will also look at non-Soviet examples, including the fabrication of forgeries online.
A subtheme of the class concerns deception of intelligence collectors, analysts and consumers.
Required Readings
Edward Jay Epstein, Deception: The Invisible War Between the KGB and the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), Chapter 2, “The Trust,” pp. 22-30; Chapter 7, “The Theory of Perfect Deception,” pp. 105-110; Chapter 13, “The Denial of Deception,” pp. 196-215; and Chapter 14, “The Confidence Game” (especially the description of Iranian deception of the Reagan National Security Council in the Iran-Contra affair), pp. 216-225.
Anatoly Golitsyn, New Lies for Old (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1984), Part 1, Chapter 1, “The Problems Facing Western Analysts,” pp. 3-9; Chapter 2, “The Patterns of Disinformation,” pp. 10-17; Chapter 6, “The Shelepin Report and Changes in Organization,” pp. 46-51; and Chapter 7, “The New Role of Intelligence,” pp. 52-57; Chapter 9, “The Vulnerability of Western Assessments,” pp. 65-69; Chapter 10, “Communist Intelligence Successes, Western Failures, and the Crisis in Western Studies,” pp. 70-78; Chapter 24, “The Impact of the Disinformation Program,” 309-323. [Cautionary note: This is an important book with good ideas and concepts, but at times the author can overdo them, so readers should be especially discerning. The author often makes inaccurate generalizations and false assumptions, some of which are a few steps beyond reality. For example, concerning the case of the Polish trade union Solidarity, which the KGB infiltrated and attempted to manipulate, Golitsyn jumps to the unsubstantiated conclusion that Solidarity was a KGB operation. I have attempted to assign only sections that are most reliable. Golitsyn was an important defector, but one must be careful in reading defector accounts because of a frequent tendency to expand on their commentaries to issues outside their areas of direct knowledge, while leading the reader to think that the defector remained "in the know." My assessment of Golitsyn is based on the opinions of professional US intelligence officers and other personnel who worked directly with him.]
John J. Dziak, “Soviet Deception: The Organizational and Operational Tradition,” in Brian D. Dailey and Patrick J. Parker, eds., Soviet Strategic Deception (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987), Chapter 1, pp. 3-20.
Herbert Romerstein, “Digging up discredited old fables,” Washington Times, 21 February 1999.
_____, “Divide and Conquer: The KGB Disinformation Campaign Against Ukrainians and Jews,” unpublished manuscript.
_____ and Stanislav Levchenko, The KGB Against the 'Main Enemy' (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987), Chapter 3, “Forgeries,” pp. 35-46; and Chapter 4, “The Whalen and Tanaka Forgeries,” pp. 47-59.
U.S. House of Representatives. Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive), Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, 6 and 19 February 1980.
Soviet Strategic Propaganda: The Nuts and Bolts of How It Worked
Soviet anti-Western propaganda continued during World War II, and increased in volume, intensity and tone as the USSR consolidated control over Central and Eastern Europe and backed the Chinese and North Korean attack on South Korea.
The West’s response marked the beginning of a decades-long strategic propaganda war (Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech, the Truman Doctrine, CIA countermeasures, public diplomacy). Soviet propaganda strategy, tactics and techniques against the U.S. and American interests stressed infiltration and exploitation of the civic institutions in the target country.
The class will discuss Soviet strategic propaganda and the United States’ attempt to replicate the methodology abroad for American national purposes.
Required readings
Smith, On Political War, Chapter 9, “The Cold War,” pp. 185-211.
Robert W. Kitrinos, "International Department of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union]," Problems of Communism, September-October 1984, pp. 47-75. Download Kitrinos - International Department of the CPSUProblems of Communism was a very highly regarded scholarly journal on Soviet and Communist affairs published by the US Information Agency during the Cold War.
Max M. Kampelman, "Communists in the CIO [Congress of Industrial Organizations union]," in Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, ed., The Strategy of Deception: A Study in World-Wide Communist Tactics (Farrar, Straus and Company, 1963), pp. 343-375. Download kampelman_communists_in_the_cio.PDF
Scan this one to get the gist of the story: The Soviet Propaganda Campaign Against the Strategic Defense Initiative, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1986. Download Soviet_propaganda_against_sdi
Some old Soviet front organizations survive, their networks still operational, but under different sponsorship. See the website of the reconstituted World Peace Council, which appears to be under Cuban and Venezuelan sponsorship.
Walter Joyce, The Propaganda Gap (New York: Harper & Row, 1963). Discusses early Cold War propaganda battle, and compares the resources devoted by the Soviet and U.S. sides; considers propaganda in terms of morality and an open society.
Herbert Romerstein and Stanislav Levchenko, The KGB Against the Main Enemy (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Publishers, 1989).
Denial and Deception (D&D) is a two-pronged concept in which one attempts to protect vital information from reaching a potential adversary (denial), while misleading that potential adversary about one’s true intentions, capabilities and vulnerabilities (deception).
Several lectures have explored the issue of deception, but this class studies D&D as a unitary concept for tactical and strategic purposes.
Although the United States practices D&D – and there is growing sentiment for it to use it with greater depth and scope against the terrorist enemy and other governments – the class focuses on how foreign governments and entities practice D&D against the U.S.
Question to consider while reading on the subject: Did Saddam Hussein run a D&D operation against Iran to deter a second Iran-Iraq war - and might Western intelligence services and United Nations inspectors been deceived by it, leading to the US decision to attack the regime in 2003?
Required Readings
Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz, “Strategic Denial and Deception,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 13, 2000, pp. 424-437. Download strategic_denial_and_deception.pdf
Abram Shulsky, “Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception,” in Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz, eds., Strategic Denial and Deception (Transaction Publishers/National Strategy Information Center, 2002), including commentaries by Richards J. Heuer, Jr. and Nina Stewart, pp. 15-39. Download shulsky_elements_of_strategic_denial_and_deception.pdf
Senior Defense Official, “Background Briefing on Enemy Denial and Deception,” U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript, 24 October 2001, pp. 1-15. (The "Senior Defense Official," who had to be anonymous at the time, was our own Professor John Yurechko. He's in the photo giving the briefing.)
U.S. Department of Defense, “Denial and Deception Strategy,” 8 pages from “Enemy Denial and Deception” briefing, 24 October 2001.
Recommended
J. Bowyer Bell, “Toward a Theory of Deception,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 16, 2003, pp. 244-279.
David A. Charters and Maurice A. J. Tugwell, eds., Deception Operations: Studies in the East-West Conflict (London: Brassey’s, 1990).
Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz, eds., Strategic Denial and Deception (Transaction Publishers/National Strategy Information Center, 2002).
Walter Jajko, “Deception: Appeal for Acceptance; Discourse on Doctrine; Preface to Planning,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 21, 2002, pp. 351-363.
A higher form of propaganda: Washington's lobbying industry
The lobbying industry in Washington is one of the most effective forms of foreign propaganda to influence American perceptions and decision-making. The method consists of "government relations" professionals - usually former congressmen, senators, legislative staff, military officers, bureaucrats and diplomats - who hire themselves out to clients as agents of influence. They add value to the foreign propaganda client because of their personal access to the target audiences.
Some lobbyists work only for US entities, or allies of the United States. Some will work for foreign clients, but not those generally considered national security threats. Some will work for national security threats but will try to rationalize that they're doing it in the interests of better relations and peace. Many are pure mercenaries who will work for anybody who pays them.
In this class, we'll look at various case studies, centered first on the case of Japan as described by author Pat Choate. We will also study Saudi, Chinese and other examples, including the case of a large European aircraft manufacturer intent on penetrating the US defense procurement market.
Required readings
Pat Choate, Agents of Influence: How Japan Manipulates America's Political and Economic System (New York: Touchstone, 1991), Chapter 4, “Washington’s Revolving Door,” pp. 49-63; Chapter 5, “Japan Buys Washington,” pp. 64-76; Chapter 7, “Hidden Interests,” pp. 109-120; Chapter 8, “The Politicians’ Politician,” pp. 121-131; and Chapter 9, “Grass-Roots Politicking,” 132-143. Note: This book was written during a time when Japanese economic strength was ascendant and many feared that the United States was in decline. Its case studies are illustrative of a widespread phenomenon in American political culture.
Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, The Lobbyists (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1992), Chapter 1, “The Usual Retainers,” pp. 3-21. Download Birnbaum_Lobbyists.pdf
Matt Welch, “Shilling for the House of Saud: Former US Ambassadors Have Become Saudi Arabia’s Apologists,” National Post (Toronto), 27 August 2002. Download welch_house_of_saud1.pdf
"Senator Shelby's Pork Parade," Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, undated. This is a long paper, but for the purposes of this class it's necessary to read only the first paragraph. Similar reports can be written about hundreds of lawmakers. I chose Senator Shelby because he has been such a stauch agent of influence for the French-German-Russian aircraft manufacturer EADS.
R. James Woolsey, "Why We Spy On Our Allies," Wall Street Journal, March 17, 2000. The former CIA director's essay addresses EADS/Airbus use of bribery of foreign leaders to out-compete the US aircraft industry abroad, and how the CIA collected intelligence that was used to neutralize those corrupt practices. This essay shows how the bribery abroad complements EADS' lobbying in the United States.
View the video
This video shows firsthand how a corrupt US congressman volunteers to serve as an agent of influence for foreign interests.
In the 1970s the FBI set up several crooked lawmakers in a sting operation known as ABSCAM. Agents posed as representatives of wealthy Arab sheiks. In this FBI surveillance video, Congressman John Murtha (D-PA) discusses his terms for acting as an agent of influence, bragging about his access and influence with the president, speaker of the House, and congressional leadership; volunteering to show the sheiks how to park their money in his district, the extent of his willingness to profit financially from the deals, and offering to advise them on how the operation can work.
Some lawmakers were convicted. Murtha was not. He was a relatively new congressman at the time, and by the time of his death in early 2010 was one of the most influential over the US military, as chairman of the House Appropriations Committee's subcommittee on defense. This 53-minute video is the unedited original from the FBI. Murtha is seated on the couch, to the right of the lamp.
The first few minutes contain the FBI agent's statement for the record and the introduction of Murtha. Things go slowly until about 13:00 in the video (you might want to fast-forward through most of it). Then the horse-trading begins. This video is a very useful educational tool. The FBI agents try to get the congressman to take a $50,000 cash bribe on video, but Murtha is cagey, saying he's not ready to take any cash at the moment but says he will likely be interested later. (He says that he's an Ethics Committee member and knows how money things have a tendency to "fall apart." His issue is not whether something is right or wrong, but about how he can cover his tracks.)
Note: While IWP does not get involved in politics, we cheer any of our students and alumni who run for public office, regardless of party affiliation. One of your colleagues, former IWP student Bill Russell, ran against Murtha in 2008 and 2010. Here's his official website: www.RussellBrigade.com.
Journalists are a propagandist’s favored target and are often used, wittingly and unwittingly, as transmission belts of information to affect the perceptions and policies of the American public and government.
The foreign propagandist will exploit the biases, economics, editorial policies and hubris of the American journalistic profession, and penetrate the media from various attack points. This class will look at the issue of foreign propaganda and the press from a historical perspective, with emphasis on case studies from the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, Vietnam, and current conflicts with Islamist extremism.
Assignment: Everyone must come to class with a hard copy of an example of foreign propaganda in the American press from the previous five days and be prepared to describe it. We will discuss these examples in class.
W. Lance Bennett, News: The Politics of Illusion, 5th ed. (Longman, 2003).
Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty: From the Crimea to Vietnam: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Myth Maker (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975).
Sarah Midgley and Virginia Rice, eds., Terrorism and the Media in the 1980s (The Media Institute, 1984).
Nancy Palmer, ed., Terrorism, War and the Press (Hollis, 2003).
Part 1: Agents of influence are among the most successful means of disseminating propaganda and disinformation to both decision-making elites and to the mass public and are utilized by many governments and non-state actors.
Many nations and non-state actors use them, but the Soviets employed them to a highly sophisticated and successful degree against the West during the Cold War. This class will focus on such agents of influence as Wilfred Burchett and Armand Hammer. (Can you guess who is in this family picture?)
Part 2: The second part of the class will be devoted to the topic of psychological warfare, or warfare waged to achieve psychological effect to influence perceptions and behavior. Be prepared to discuss the Linebarger text during this class.
Required Readings
Ladislav Bittman, The KGB and Soviet Disinformation (Pergamon Brassey's, 1985), Chapter 4, "The Messenger," pp. 70-90. Check back for Bittman
Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov, The Secret World of American Communism (Yale University Press, 1995), "Julius and Armand Hammer," pp. 26-31: Download Klehr et al, Secret World of American Communism
Louis Budenz, The Techniques of Communism (Regnery, 1954), Chapter 7, "The Role of the Communist Press," pp. 125-149; Chapter 8, "Affecting Public Opinion," pp. 153-180; and Chapter 11, "Use and Abuse of Minority Groups," pp. 250-277. [Budenz was assigned for September 20, but now you're ahead of the game. If you need to download the chapters, click here to the September 20 class page and scroll down.]
Paul M. A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (Coachwhip reprint, 2010). Read entire book; it's last on this list because of the organization of the course, but you need to read it and know it thoroughly nevertheless.
Handout (in class)
Political Intelligence from the Territory of the USSR – Training Text. (Moscow: Red Banner Yu. V. Andropov Institute of the KGB, 1989). Translated selections from a KGB training manual, Politicheskaya razvedka s territorii CCCP – Uchevnoye nosovie (Moskva, Krasnoznamennii Institut KGB SSSR imeni Yu. B. Andropova, 1989).This is a real exclusive for this course - the only known copy of the classified KGB training text on recruitment of foreign agents of influence.